Disrupting Somali piracy via trust and influence operations by Bair, Robert S.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2009-06
Disrupting Somali piracy via trust and influence operations
Bair, Robert S.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 









 Thesis Advisor:   Dorothy Denning 
 Second Reader: Steven Iatrou 
  
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2009 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
Disrupting Somali Piracy via Trust and Influence Operations 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Robert S. Bair 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
This thesis analyzes the piracy problem in East Africa focusing specifically on Somali pirate networks. It provides an 
historical background of the political unrest in Somalia during the late 1980s and early 1990s and the subsequent 
government collapse that followed in an attempt to identify the root cause of the piracy problem and facilitate the 
derivation of solutions based on trust and influence operations. The study then examines the make-up, motivation, and 
structure of Somali pirate networks to understand how they organize and operate, and how the organizations might be 
disrupted. The study addresses current anti-piracy efforts and the reasons why they are not effective in preventing and 
deterring Somali pirates. Alternative solutions based on instilling distrust and suspicion within the groups and 
undermining the alliances between the pirate groups and their support structures are proposed. The techniques and 
methods proposed in this study have been used to disrupt criminal organizations in the past and may be effective in 
combating Somali piracy.  
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
79 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 
 
Trust, influence, influence operations, piracy, Somalia, Somali Piracy, disruption, deception  

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
  ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
DISRUPTING SOMALI PIRACY VIA TRUST AND INFLUENCE OPERATIONS 
 
Robert S. Bair 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.S., Carnegie Mellon University, 2003 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























Dan C. Boger 
Chairman, Department of Information Sciences 
 
  iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  v
ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the piracy problem in East Africa focusing specifically on 
Somali pirate networks. It provides an historical background of the political unrest in 
Somalia during the late 1980s and early 1990s and the subsequent government collapse 
that followed in an attempt to identify the root cause of the piracy problem and facilitate 
the derivation of solutions based on trust and influence operations. The study then 
examines the make-up, motivation, and structure of Somali pirate networks to understand 
how they organize and operate, and how the organizations might be disrupted. The study 
addresses current anti-piracy efforts and the reasons why they are not effective in 
preventing and deterring Somali pirates. Alternative solutions based on instilling distrust 
and suspicion within the groups and undermining the alliances between the pirate groups 
and their support structures are proposed. The techniques and methods proposed in this 
study have been used to disrupt criminal organizations in the past and may be effective in 
combating Somali piracy.  
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This thesis analyzes the piracy problem in East Africa focusing specifically on 
Somali pirate networks. It provides an historical background of the political unrest in 
Somalia during the late 1980s and early 1990s and the subsequent government collapse 
that followed in an attempt to identify the root cause of the piracy problem and facilitate 
the derivation of solutions based on trust and influence operations. The study examines 
the make-up, motivation, and structure of Somali pirate networks to understand how they 
organize and operate, and how the organizations might be disrupted.  
The study addresses current anti-piracy efforts and the reasons why they are not 
effective in preventing and deterring Somali pirates. Alternative solutions based on 
instilling distrust and suspicion within the groups and undermining the alliances between 
the pirate groups and their support structures are proposed. The techniques and methods 
proposed in this study have been used to disrupt criminal organizations in the past and 
may be effective in combating Somali piracy.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
The dramatic increase in ship hijackings and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden 
and Indian Ocean near Somalia pose a serious security concern for all nations with 
maritime assets operating in the region. Annually, nearly 16,000 ships pass through the 
Gulf of Aden, carrying valuable cargo, such as oil form the Middle East or consumer 
goods produced in Asia, en route to Europe and the Americas (Middleton, 2008). These 
ships, along with their crews and valuable cargo, are being targeted and attacked by 
bands of pirates operating from bases within the failed state of Somalia at an alarmingly 
increasing rate. The attacks and the negative side effects associated with them have the 
potential of disrupting and dramatically affecting global trade. 
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In 2008, Attacks in the Gulf of Aden reached their highest levels since reporting 
started in 1992, with piracy in East Africa up 200% from the previous year (See Table 1) 
(Hanson, 2009). There were 111 attempted hijackings in 2008, 42 of which succeeded 
(IMB reports unprecedented rise in maritime hijackings.). In the first four months of 
2009 there have been 66 attacks against merchant shipping vessels operating in and 
around the Gulf of Aden (Associated Press, 2009b), and those numbers are likely 
underreported due to the sheer volume of maritime crime occurring in the region (IMB 
reports unprecedented rise in maritime hijackings.). According to some experts, up to 
50% of attacks are not reported “largely because subsequent investigations and delays 
result in costs that the ship companies themselves must bear” (Chalk, 2008, p. 7). Prior to 
the end of 2007, pirate gangs primarily operated in the Gulf of Aden within a fifty-mile 
radius of the port of Mogadishu (Middleton, 2008). However, in the past twenty months 
they have increased their operating radius to nearly 400 nautical miles, expanding their 
area of operations into the Indian Ocean. The pirates are now stalking ships over an area 
covering more than 2.8 million square kilometers ("MV Sirius Star"). The shift in tactics 
and extension in range exemplifies the pirates’ willingness and ability to operate outside 
the areas patrolled by designated anti-piracy forces. Figures one through three illustrate 






















Table 1.   Number of Attempted and Actual Attacks in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden 
[After: Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report 2008]   
 




Figure 2.   Location of Actual and Attempted Piracy Attacks 2008 [From: ICC IMB Live 
Piracy Map] 
 
Figure 3.   Location of Actual and Attempted Piracy Attacks 2009 [From: ICC IMB Live 
Piracy Map] 
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The implications and dangers of piracy in east Africa reach well beyond Somalia 
and Africa. A vast majority of ships operate under flags from Europe, Asia, and North 
America and are crewed by citizens of many nations. The implications include but are not 
limited to: (1) The physical threat to the ship’s crew; (2) the financial implications for 
businesses and countries with international shipping interests in the region; (3) the 
political implications of the attacks and the disruption of humanitarian assistance to the 
region; (4) the potential for environmental disaster; and (5) the possibility that pirate 
groups may link up with Islamic extremist or terror groups. These are a grave concern to 
the international community.  
1. Danger to the Ship’s Crew 
One of the most obvious dangers of piracy is the threat of physical harm to the 
crew of a hijacked vessel. In many cases pirates fire upon the target vessel with automatic 
weapons and rocket propelled grenades (RPG) in an attempt to force the vessel to slow or 
stop for ease of boarding. After the attack on the Maersk Alabama and subsequent killing 
of three Somali pirates by U.S. forces in April 2009, pirates have vowed to “seek out the 
Americans and if we capture them we will slaughter them” (Somali Pirates Vow to Hunt 
Down, Kill Americans in Revenge.2009). Previously the largest threat to mariners was 
being struck by indirect fire or the collateral damage caused by the attacks. However, this 
overt threat may suggest a change in the pirates’ modus operandi. The recent shift 
towards more violent tactics is “seldom recognized, largely because assaults tend to be 
directed against less than visible targets,” referring to ships operating on the high seas 
(Chalk, 2008, p. 15). “If you had civilian aircraft being threatened or bazookas being 
fired at train drivers, there would be a public outcry. Because it’s shipping, it’s out of 
sight out of mind” (Chalk, 2008, p. 15). The international community should be deeply 
concerned about the well-being of their citizens because “as of December 31, 2008 
Somali pirates were holding 13 vessels for ransom and 242 crew hostage” (Ismail, 2009, 
p. 1). The crews already in captivity and those who may be captured in the future are in 
grave danger of being subjected to violent activity in an essentially lawless state.  
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2. Financial Implications 
The attacks on commercial vessels cost shipping companies nearly $150 million 
in ransom monies in 2008 and the price of consumer goods increased an estimated $60 to 
$70 million dollars to compensate for losses and expenses related to pirate attacks (BBC 
News, 2008). In addition, the cost of insurance premiums for companies operating in the 
Gulf of Aden has increased tenfold in the last year (Middleton, 2008). If the danger does 
not subsist and insurance premiums continue to rise, companies will be forced to alter 
shipping routes to avoid transiting through the Gulf of Aden. “The extra weeks of travel 
and fuel consumption would add considerably to the cost of transporting goods. At a time 
when the price of oil is a major concern, anything that could contribute to a further rise in 
prices must be considered very serious indeed” (Middleton, 2008, p. 3). It is estimated 
that East African piracy costs the international community over $1 billion dollars a year 
from increased insurance premiums, freight expenses, and the cost of rerouting ships to 
avoid known problem areas (Hanson, 2009).  
3. Political Implications 
The dangers of these attacks stem far beyond the physical threat to the safety of 
the crew and increased costs forced upon the shipping company.  In addition to the 
financial impacts of piracy, there are geopolitical repercussions of piracy that may 
demand greater concern including the further destabilization of the region caused by a 
lack of governance and humanitarian assistance (Hanson, 2009); the potential for an 
environmental disaster; and the possible link of piracy to violent extremist groups 
(Middleton, 2008). 
The collapse of Somalia’s government in the early 1990s left the country 
impoverished and in great need of humanitarian aid. A serious drought and violent 
clashes between warring factions over control of disputed territories has only further 
exacerbated the problem. The United Nations World Food Program (WFP) estimates 
Somalia will need 185,000 tons of food aid in 2008 (Middleton, 2008). Foodstuffs are 
routinely delivered to the Somali people by sea because transporting it by land is 
impractical and extremely dangerous. Violent activities on the high seas forced the WFP 
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to seek naval escorts to ensure the safety of their ships. In 2008, when the Netherlands 
completed its escort duties, food deliveries were halted for two months due to the 
difficulty of finding a country to take over the dangerous escort duties. In a country with 
over a million displaced personnel, two months without aid can seem like an eternity 
(Middleton, 2008). The lack of food and widespread poverty has caused some Somali 
people to turn to regional warlords for relief. With an abundance of arms and weaponry, 
warlords direct the personnel to violent activities such as robbery and piracy to fund the 
clan. International food aid and humanitarian assistance are essential to alleviating violent 
activity within Somalia. Piracy and crime on the high seas makes aid delivery and 
assistance much more difficult. 
4. Potential for Environmental Disaster   
The potential for an attack to create a hazardous environmental catastrophe is very 
real. Oil tankers routinely pass through these dangerous waters and in some cases fall 
victim to pirate attacks. In November 2008, the Sirius Star, a Saudi oil tanker carrying 
two million barrels of oil was attacked by pirates who fired rocket-propelled grenades 
(RPG) and automatic weaponry at the ship in an attempt to board ("MV Sirius Star"). In 
April 2008, in a similar “attack on the Takayama the ship’s fuel tanks were penetrated 
and oil spilled into the sea” (Middleton, 2008, p. 4). An oil fire or large spill caused by an 
RPG attack could result in an environmental disaster that could destroy wildlife and 
cause severe damage to the fragile and valuable ecosystem in the Gulf of Aden and 
Indian Ocean.  
5. Pirate Links to Extremist Groups 
There is some concern that Somali pirates could become agents of terrorist 
networks, and that ransoms may be funneled to terrorist organizations (Middleton, 2008, 
p. 10). While no formal ties between East African pirates and terrorist groups have been 
established to date, Army General William “Kip” Ward, head of the Pentagon’s Africa 
Command, told the Associated Press, “if you look at the clan structure or the tribes – to 
think that there may not be linkages is probably naïve” (Associated Press, 2009a). The 
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large ransoms – in some cases more than $3 million U.S. dollars – could be utilized by 
extremist groups to finance worldwide terror campaigns (Wadhams, 2009). Al-Shabab, 
an Al-Qaeda linked terrorist organization, “lashed out publicly at a group of pirates late 
last year after they attacked the Sirius Star” (STRATFOR, 2008, p. 2). However, the 
temptation to reap the benefits from pirate activities and finance a jihadist campaign may 
be too attractive to keep the two from joining forces. In addition to the financial 
implications of association, terrorist organizations would have access to a maritime 
weapon delivery method enabled by the maritime expertise and skill possessed by the 
pirate gangs. Attacks on naval assets or large ships that could slow or stop regional trade 
would not lie outside the realm of possibility. For example, “a large ship sunk in the 
approach to the Suez Canal would have a devastating impact on global trade” (Middleton, 
2008, p. 10). In addition, terrorist groups could utilize the hostages from hijackings at sea 
“as bargaining chips or high-profile victims of an atrocity” to further their ideological 
objectives (Middleton, 2008, p. 10). 
6. Conclusion 
The importance in curtailing piracy in East Africa cannot be overstated. The 
financial and geopolitical impacts and danger to the environment should cause great 
concern to the international community. In Suppression of Piracy and Maritime 
Terrorism, Martin Murphy notes, “piracy is a crime defined by geography that requires 
the presence of other factors such as a permissive political environment, cultural 
acceptability, and the opportunity for reward in order to flourish” (p. 25). The factors that 
contribute to the emergence and sustainment of piracy are not likely to be eliminated, but 
may potentially be suppressed if local and national leaders can find reasons and resources 
to do so (Murphy, 2007). Decisive action must be taken to prevent or curtail attacks in 
east Africa and restore law to the high seas in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. 
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C. METHODOLOGY, SCOPE, AND ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS 
1. Methodology and Scope 
The methodology of this thesis is mainly analytical and draws on historical 
examples to identify the root causes of Somali piracy, determine why current anti-piracy 
operations have failed, illustrate how trust and influence operations have been 
successfully applied against criminal networks in the past, and identify how such 
operations might be effective against pirate networks. 
This study focuses exclusively on East African piracy stemming from Somalia. 
Also, while the thesis reviews a range of counter-piracy approaches that have been tried, 
it focuses on new solutions that use trust and influence operations to instill distrust within 
the network and its support structure. No other pirate networks or regions are analyzed. 
However, examples are drawn from other criminal organizations to illustrate how trust 
and influence operations have been successfully used in the past and might be applied to 
the Somali piracy problem. 
2. Organization of Chapters 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. This first chapter stated the purpose of 
the thesis, its importance to the international community, the methodology utilized to 
generate the proposed solutions and conclusions, and a chapter outline. The second 
chapter contains background information regarding the collapse of the Somali 
government and breakdown of the social infrastructure from which the piracy problem 
evolved. It describes the proposed root causes of the piracy in an effort to tailor a 
response able to effectively address the problem. Chapter II also provides an analysis of 
the size, make-up, organization, and motivations of pirate networks. The third chapter 
presents an overview of current anti-piracy missions being conducted by the international 
community. These efforts are analyzed and scrutinized for their limited effectiveness in 
treating preventing and deterring further attacks. Chapter IV utilizes the framework and 
analysis conducted in the first three chapters to generate proposed solutions based on 
trust and influence techniques. The alternative solutions are based on instilling distrust 
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and suspicion within the groups and undermining the alliances between the pirate groups 
and their support structures. Finally, Chapter V gives conclusions based on the previous 




II. SOMALIA AND PIRATE NETWORKS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an historical background of the Somali 
people and of the collapse of the Somali government in the early 1990s. An analysis of 
the historical context behind the emergence of piracy in the region provides insights on 
the true causes of the resurrection of piracy and how the problem may be addressed. 
Furthermore, widely accepted root causes of piracy are explored. 
In addition, pirate networks will be described to identify their organizational and 
support structures, size, and leadership. This information is utilized in Chapter IV to 
identify areas where trust and influence operations may be injected to disrupt the 
network. 
B. SOMALIA: AN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
An analysis of Somalia’s past may give insights into what has caused the dramatic 
increase in piracy in the past two decades. In the late 1800s, the area was colonized by 
western powers, Italy, France, and Britain, breaking a generally ethnically homogeneous, 
clan based population into artificially diverse groups separated by boundaries designated 
by their colonial rulers. After Somalia gained its independence from the colonial powers 
in 1960, the population momentarily embraced a centralized democratic government that 
sought to unify all ethnic Somalis and clan fiefdoms. However, the populace never quite 
achieved the ethnic solidarity needed for a successful democracy. This lead to a military 
coup under which General Siad Barre would control the country with an iron first for 
over twenty years. Barre’s favoritism and cruel treatment of certain ethnic groups and 
clans lead to his overthrow in 1991 and began an era of perpetual volatility characterized 
by violent clashes between warlord clan leaders.  Since 1991 there has been no central 
government, “no ministries; no systematic maintenance of infrastructure; and Somalia 
cannot ratify international conventions since technically it does not exist” (Lindner, 2001 
p. 87). The country fell into a state of anarchy leaving millions dead or starving.  
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Did the lawlessness, lack of government support, and impoverished state lead to 
the rise of modern piracy or were there other factors at hand that caused the problem? 
This analysis seeks to provide a background to allow the reader to answer those questions 
and to establish the root causes of piracy to help the reader understand the problem and 
methods by which it may be treated. It also recognizes the importance of clan structures 
in Somali society which could present opportunities for exploitation or injection of 
influence operations. 
1. Ethnic Identity 
It is important to understand the ethnic makeup of the Somali population and how 
they identify themselves before an analysis of the government or lack thereof takes place. 
Studies of the Somali people suggest they unite ethnically “by language, by culture, 
religion, and by social institutions. They belong to one single family of African peoples 
inhabiting the Horn of Africa, known to linguists as Cushitic (Hamitic)” (Lindner, 2001 
p. 88). In addition, many Somali people identify themselves with their ancestral nomadic 
peoples who traveled the “vast arid savannah grasslands of Eastern Africa…united by 
their pristine pride, their interdependence in rather egalitarian, horizontal societal 
relations of alliances and conflicts with great autonomy for each grouping; in other words 
they live in almost unconnected coexistences” (Lindner, 2001 p. 89). In essence, the 
people of Somalia have been opposed to vertically organized, bureaucratic structures 
typically seen in the west and better identify with their tribal ancestry and clan like 
authoritarian structure (Lindner, 2001).  Clans claim to be descended from their Arab 
ancestors with nearly seventy-five percent of the Somali population coming from 
“traditionally pastoral nomadic clans including Dir, Daarood, Isaaq, and Hawiye” 
(Lindner, 2001 p. 88). It is this clan-based identification that dominates the Somali way 
of life. Figure 4 illustrates a rough outline of the ethnic Somali clan structure while figure 
5 illustrates the distribution of these clans throughout the country. Throughout the 
region’s history the importance and prominence of this identification establishes itself as 












Figure 5.   Distribution of Clans throughout Somalia [From (Media Maps, 1992)] 
The Somali people also feel “united by their devotion to Islam,” although not the 
Wahhabi version that is predominant in the Arabian Peninsula (Lindner, 2001 p. 89). 
(Moller, 2009b, p. 8) The Somalis embraced their own version of the Islamic religion, 
Sufist, which is represented by the Qadiriya, Salihiya, and Ahmadiya brotherhoods 
(Moller, 2009b, p. 8). Today, several Islamist groups including the radical group, Al-
Shabab, play an important role in the government of Somalia.     
2. Colonization 
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the colonial powers of Italy, Britain, and France 
discovered they had uses for Somali territories and began to stake claims. Anna Simons 
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said of the colonization, “The European scramble for control over eastern trade led to 
protectionist and counter-protectionist seizures across the globe. If Britain acquired Aden 
to protect its Suez routes to the subcontinent, then France had to acquire something 
nearby as a counterweight (hence Djibouti)” (Lindner, 2001 p. 89). Once the colonial 
powers were through with their land grab, the Somali people had been broken up into five 
western ruled territories: (1) Djibouti, under French control, which includes the ethnically 
related Afar tribesman (Lindner, 2001 p. 89); (2) the British controlled northern part or 
present day Somaliland as well as all of present day Kenya (Moller, 2009b, p. 8); (3) 
Italian Somalia with Mogadishu as the capital; (4) the Somali tribesman area controlled 
by Britain in Northern Kenya; (5) the Ethiopian portion comprised of the Ogaden and 
Dire Dawa territories (Lindner, 2001). With the Somali identity tied to their nomadic 
roots, autonomous clan structure, and sense of tribal individualism, the colonization of 
their peoples by the French, British, and Italians certainly did not fit into their 
conventional roles and views of government influence. Ethnic Somali’s already 
possessed a sense of identity although there were no formal borders established by 
governments or central authoritarian structure. The clans identified and established their 
own communities and operated as an autonomous entity in a population of like-minded 
individuals. Figure 6 illustrates the distribution of ethnic Somalis in relation to formally 
declared borders of Somalia and other states in the region. 
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Figure 6.   The distribution of Ethnic Somali’s [From (Figure 1, Moller, 2009b, p. 9)] 
The once autonomous, self-organizing, clan based society was now placed under 
the control of western powers.  A people who once were united by religion and ancestral 
roots were now separated by five artificially created borders in the self interest of the 
colonial power. Ali Mauzui, as quoted by Evelin Linder, writes, “Most other African 
countries are colonially created states in search of a sense of nationhood. The Somali, by 
contrast, are a pre-colonial nation in search of a unified post-colonial state. Most other 
African countries are diverse peoples in search of a shared national identity. The Somali 
are already a people with a national identity in search of territorial unification” (Lindner, 
2001 p. 89). The clan fiefdoms were forced to comply with the military might of the 
colonial powers. 
3. Somali Independence 
The Somali people were subjected to colonial rule for nearly half a century. In 
1960, the former British Protectorate of Somaliland in the north and the Italian Trust 
Territory of Somalia united and became the Republic of Somalia. The three other regions 
comprised of people of Somali identity did not join the new republic. The Ethiopians and 
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Kenyans would not annex territory to the republic and France would not relinquish 
control of Djibouti. Somalis would not completely regain the ethnic solidarity they once 
enjoyed before colonial rule. The idea of independent clans ruling autonomously seemed 
to fall by the way side and gave way to a temporary democratic government in the 
Republic of Somalia.  
Although the democratic government thrived initially, it soon lost credibility 
amongst citizens. The initial successes most likely contributed to the new government’s 
efforts to reunite ethnic Somalis under a single government structure. While most ethnic 
Somalis identified with a particular clan and pledged their loyalties to separate, 
autonomous clan-based fiefdoms, nearly all Somali’s believed in the concept of ‘Asabia’ 
or social solidarity introduced by North African philosopher Ibn Khaldun in the 14th 
century (Lindner, 2001). The concept implied that the Somali people “sought to unite all 
Somalis including those in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti into one unitary state” 
(Lindner, 2001 p. 90). The five-pointed star on the new Somali flag would illustrate the 
Somali sense of nationalism. “The five points represented former British Somaliland and 
Italian Somalia – which were united within a week of independence – plus Djibouti, the 
Ogadeen province of Ethiopia and the north-eastern part of Kenya” (Moller, 2009b, p. 8). 
However, Asabia failed to come to fruition due to the previously mentioned territorial 
disputes with Ethiopia, Kenya, and French Djibouti, and Somali nationalism was never 
achieved and the government soon came to be “perceived as anarchic and corrupt” 
(Lindner, 2001 p.90). Former clan leaders and those placed into power by the colonial 
rulers vied for power. Elections became chaotic, corruption amongst public officials was 
rampant, and the elites of society lived in luxury (Lindner, 2001). Democracy was to be 
short lived in Somalia. It lasted only nine years. “The March 1969 elections, the last 
democratic elections in Somalia so far, saw 62 parties being created at the national level, 
and 1002 candidates standing for 123 seats” (Lindner, 2001 p. 90). Democracy was 
failing to unite Somali’s as it was intended. In fact, it was acting to further divide the 
people and fostering corruption. In October 1969, the newly elected President Shermarke 
was murdered. This would mark the end of democracy in Somalia. 
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4. Authoritarian Rule 
The murder of President Shermarke and the troubles associated with a Somali 
democracy paved way for a “dictatorial savior to seize power” (Lindner, 2001 p. 91). The 
very next day, General Siad Barre, a general in the Somali army, claimed the presidency. 
The new president also revitalized the idea of Asabia and sought to unite all Somali’s 
under a central government. “He condemned tribalism and clanism and seemed to stand 
for a government that wished to care for all Somalis and not just for one clan” (Lindner, 
2001 p. 91). He quickly established a socialist government and befriended the Soviet 
Union in order to capitalize on Soviet financing during the Cold War.  
The first few years of Barre’s rule were peaceful and the country experienced 
significant steps towards national and economic development. He built a large and 
powerful army, and would use it to further his goal of Asabia. His sense of nationalism 
and desire to reunite the ethnic Somali people lead him to attack Ethiopia in 1978. Barre 
supported Somali rebel separatist groups inside Ethiopia, namely the Western Somali 
Liberation Front (WSLF) and with the backing of the Soviet Union, Barre attempted to 
free Ogadeen and the ethnic Somali’s who occupied the area (Moller, 2009b).  
The Ogadeen War involved over 300,000 Somalis, Ethiopians, Soviets, Cubans, 
Eritreans, and Yemenites (Lindner, 2001 p. 92). The Soviet backed Somalis were on the 
verge of victory when a bizarre turn of events occurred. Said Samatar, as quoted by 
Linder said, “The resourceful Ethiopians, as usual, bushwhacked the Somalis through 
international diplomacy. They declared themselves socialist and appealed for help from 
their ‘fraternal Soviet Socialist’ people. The Soviets were only too happy to oblige. 
Switching support from the Somalis, they shipped into Ethiopia in February and March 
1978 some $US 1.5 billion in military hardware, together with two leading Soviet 
generals and 1500 advisers. The majority of the advisers went straight from their advisory 
positions in the Somali army and, in tragicomic turn of events in keeping with Somali 
history, took with them practically all of the Somali maps of the region, showing to the 
enemy the troop movements and disposition of the Somali army. For good measure, the 
Soviets directed Fidel Castro, wager of Soviet proxy wars in Africa, to pitch in with 
  19
11,000 Cuban troops. Ethiopia, by the region’s standard, had now an awesome force. 
Within weeks they had the Somalis ejected from Ogadeen” (p. 92). General Barre 
severely overestimated his country’s importance to the Soviet Union. After the USSR 
changed their allegiance to support Ethiopia, Barre thought he could count on assistance 
from the United States. Again, he overestimated the strategic importance of his country 
and President Carter denied his request for support. Somalia’s fate was settled (Moller, 
2009b). 
The defeat left Barre and his army humiliated and the country became “more 
despotic and increasingly infected by clanism, notwithstanding its early attempts to ban 
clanism and tribalism” (Moller, 2009b, p. 10). The peaceful and prosperous times 
experienced at the beginning of the Barre regime were gone. He felt he had to secure his 
position as dictator and was wary of any coup attempts against him. He placed blame 
regarding the defeat on others in the regime, mainly the Somalis in the northern part of 
the country (Lindner, 2001 p. 92). The northern clans were a convenient scapegoat for 
Barre since he was descended from the Marehan sub-clan in the South of Somalia 
(Lindner, 2001). In an attempt to reclaim power and shift the blame away from his 
regime, Barre sent his army to attack the Majerteen and Isaaq peoples in the north. Clan 
structure and loyalty once again became a central theme in the lives of the Somali people. 
The president continued his assault on the people he blamed for his defeat and the 
positions of power within the government were quickly filled with members of Barre’s 
native Marehan clan and others of the Ogadeen and Dulbahante clans (Moller, 2009b). 
The peaceful and supportive dictator became a violent oppressor of any group who he 
perceived as a threat to his power. He cut off all aid to the northern part of his country 
and removed or had executed anyone he identified as a threat to his rule.  
Barre’s oppression and violence against the Somali people continued over the 
following decade. “Government forces were determined to suppress grass roots rebellion 
amongst the northern clans. As many as 100,000 people are thought to have died as a 
result of the attacks. Some 250,000 sought refuge in border camps in Ethiopia, or fled to 
the countryside for safe haven. Thousands more citizens in the eastern and middle regions 
of the country had, over the years, their villages burned, livestock looted, and families 
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made destitute or killed by the soldiers of a govement which would not tolerate criticism 
– a government which was at war with its own people” (Lindner, 2001 p. 95). Barre 
continued to target clans that he felt were a threat to his power and further divided his 
country along clan lines. 
5. The Fall of Said Barre and Re-emergence of Clan Based Fiefdoms 
In December 1990, Barre’s hold on the government of Somalia began to wane. He 
no longer had the backing of the U.S.S.R. or the United States and could no longer 
control his rival clans. By January 1991, Siad Barre was ousted from power and a battle 
to gain control of the country began. Clan based militias vying for power “killed 
hundreds of thousands and led to wide spread starvation across Somalia” (Hansen, 2006, 
p. 5). The most powerful clan leaders were able to quickly seize power or create alliances 
with other clans that would characterize several regions of the fractured country.  
In the months leading up to Barre’s overthrow an Ethiopian backed secessionist 
group called the Somali National Movement along with a group of northern clan elders, 
primarily from the Isaaq clan, met and declared the former British northwestern area 
bordering Djibouti, Somaliland (Lindner, 2001). At about the same time in the Mijerteen 
controlled northeast another semi-autonomous region, Puntland, was established by the 
Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) who opposed the central government 
(Moller, 2009b). In the capital of Mogadishu severe inter-clan fighting was taking place. 
General Aideed and the Habr Abgal clan and Ali Mahdi Mohamed and his Abgal clan 
were in a bloody fight for power. By 1992, in Mogadishu and the immediate vicinity 
alone, 300,000 people died from hunger or related illnesses and 44,000 were killed in the 
fighting (Moller, 2009b). In Somalia’s southern areas, Barre’s supporters continued to 
battle with rival clans. The fighting transformed the southern areas of Gedo, Bay, Bakool, 
Lower Shabelle, Lower Juba, and Middle Juba regions into a virtual wasteland (Hansen, 
2006). The violence and efforts to restore order in the south would continue for nearly a 
decade. 
The role of Islamism was not extraordinarily important in the first civil war. The 
moderate nature of the Sufi Somali version of Islam did not lead to any rise in radical 
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Islamist activity, however several more rigid Salafist groups emerged during the period 
and Al-Qaeda attempted to establish a front in Somalia, but failed miserably. Radical 
Salafist ideas did not sit well with the Somali people (Moller, 2009b).  
In 1994 Somalia was left to its own devices and began to self-organize and re-
established the “traditional social structures in Somalia with their customary law (xeer) 
and the clan system with its diya (blood money) norms served to contain both feud and 
criminal violence through a system of mutual deterrence in which the clan elders played a 
central role in constraining their respective clan members” (Moller, 2009b, p. 13). The 
lack of central governance and social programs were temporarily replaced by Islamic 
organizations and liberal Sharia court systems. These systems proved enough to 
moderately regulate the people and promote discipline and good order all while fostering 
a fairly successful business environment (Moller, 2009b). 
In late 2000, the Transnational National Government (TNG) of Somalia was 
established with the backing of the United Nations (UN). The goal of the TFG was to 
take control of the southern two thirds of Somali and unite the warlords who divided the 
country into a clan fiefdom. However, the TNG would only control several small areas in 
the capital and a few enclaves in the countries interior and never gained the clan support 
necessary to unite under a central government (Moller, 2009b). Then in 2004, the 
Transnational Federal Government (TFG) was established along with a parliamentary 
system that allowed various clans to appoint parliament leaders. The TFG was too weak 
to enforce its authority over the country and requested the assistance of the United 
Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) for protection. In 2006, with help of Ethiopian 
forces the TFG finally was stood up in Mogadishu, however to date is still too weak to 
take control of the entire country. 
Also in 2006, a group of Islamists came together and formed the Union of Islamic 
Courts (UIC) and took over the area the TFG sought to control. The UIC ousted the 
warlords who had controlled the area for the last 15 years, and established a strict form of 
Sharia law that brought temporary stability to the volatile region. They reopened ports 
and the airport in Mogadishu and dismantled the many roadblocks throughout the city, 
dramatically improving the day-to-day lives of the civilian population. (Moller, 2009b) In 
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addition, the UIC was in strict opposition to piracy and was able to effectively irradiate it 
for the second half of 2006 (Stuhldreher, 2008). However, the UIC rejected the role of the 
TFG and declared a defensive jihad on the Ethiopian military that was trying to protect 
the TFG. The UIC had a mixture of radicals and moderates with no clearly defined 
leadership structure which would likely lead to its downfall. The radical branch was 
suspected of carrying out terrorist attacks and supporting the violent Al-Shabab militia 
(Moller, 2009b). The United States and Ethiopia disapproved of the Islamists rule and, 
near the end of 2006, Ethiopian troops with the backing and support of a few US Special 
Operations teams with authority of the TFG drove the Islamists from power (Lennox, 
2008). The area was once again reverted to clan-based factions struggling to establish 
control of the region. 
Today, the stability and prosperity of Somalia is as diverse as the clans who 
occupy the area. In some areas, a terrible humanitarian crisis rages on, while in others the 
population enjoys relative prosperity (Powell, Ford, & Nowrasteh, 2006). The region of 
Somaliland remains relatively stable while the semi-autonomous region of Puntland is 
riddled with crime and likely harbors most of the pirates carrying out the attacks on 
international shipping. The diversity of the political landscape in Somalia and its complex 
past with a strong favoring of clan-based rule suggests order will not be established in 
Somalia any time soon, and the chances of a domestically supported Somali answer to the 
piracy problem is most likely not going to occur. The historical context by which Somalia 
has arrived in its current state will help to identify target areas for which trust and 
influence operations can be injected to break up the organizations or disrupt their patterns 
of behavior to curtail the piracy problem, namely, the importance and understanding of 
the Somali reliance of clans and their identification with certain warlords who are thought 
to control the pirate networks. Dating back thousands of years, ethnic Somalis have 
identified with a particular clan with the hopes of one day uniting all clans under a central 
government without relinquishing control of its people. From the onset of colonial rule 
through the rule of General Siad Barre, the autonomous rule of clan-based societies was 
oppressed and not recognized. With the collapse of Barre’s government and resurgence 
of the warlord ruled clan fiefdoms it has become apparent how important this structure is 
  23
to the Somali people. This provides a unique opportunity for exploitation and division to 
attempt to curtail the maritime piracy problem.  
C. ROOT CAUSES 
From the historical analysis it is difficult to ascertain the root causes of the piracy 
problem and establish a direct cause and effect relationship. However, it is clear that the 
social framework and order typically provided by a functioning government is not present 
and there is a lack of infrastructure along with a greatly divided political system which all 
contributes to the two most widely accepted theories regarding the cause of modern 
piracy off the coast of Somalia: (1) piracy is a crime of opportunity for an oppressed and 
impoverished population or; (2) piracy is an act of self defense against more powerful 
nations seeking to exploit the region’s water resources.  
Many argue that piracy is simply a crime of opportunity that resulted after the 
collapse of Barre’s regime. The theory suggests that because of the absence of a coast 
guard to patrol the waters off the coast and lack of a police force capable of enforcing 
laws on land, combined with an abundance of ships passing offshore, the piracy problem 
grew organically out of necessity and opportunity. “According to the final report of the 
experts group convened in November 2008 by U.N. Special Representative to Somalia 
Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, poverty, lack of employment, environmental hardship, pitifully 
low incomes, reduction of pastoralist and maritime resources due to drought and illegal 
fishing and a volatile security and political situation all contribute to the rise and 
continuance of piracy in Somalia” (Ploch, Blanchard, O'Rourke, Mason, & King, 2009, p. 
7). Those engaged in piracy see it as an opportunity to gain financial reward in a country 
where a steady income and food are hard to come by. “While the profitability of piracy 
appears to be the primary motivating factor for most pirates, other observers argue that 
since conditions in Somalia make survival difficult for many and prosperity elusive for 
most, the relative risk of engagement in piracy appears to have been lowered in many 
areas” (Ploch et al., 2009, p. 7). 
Others assert the problem is an act of self-defense. They claim the regions 
national resources are being exploited by nations seeking to make a profit in Somalia’s 
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recognized economic exclusive zone. The two most widely recognized areas of concern 
are illegal fishing and dumping. The theory suggests that the pirates initially acted as a 
marine defense force seeking to drive away foreign vessels engaged in what they 
considered illegal activities. “These armed groups of young Somali fisherman quickly 
learned, however, it was far more lucrative and far less dangerous to attacks large and 
generally unarmed commercial vessels” (Lennox, 2008, p. 9). The activities were 
supported on shore and not subjected to criminal prosecution because of the widespread 
destitution and starvation in the area (Lennox, 2008). 
Katie Stuhldreher of George Washington University says, “the problem of piracy 
in Somalia originated about a decade ago because of disgruntled fisherman. The headless 
state had no authority to patrol its tuna-rich coastal waters and foreign commercial 
vessels swooped in to cast their nets. This proved a slap in the face for Somalis, who saw 
these vessels as illegal and raking in profits at the expense of the local impoverished 
population. That prompted local fisherman to attacks foreign vessels and demand 
compensation” (p. 1). The fisherman’s initial aims were to secure the waters from local 
competition and ensure their continued prosperity in the fishing industry. However, “the 
success of these early raids in the mid-1990s persuaded many young men to hang up their 
nets in favor of AK-47s” (Stuhldreher, 2008, p. 1). The fisherman eventually teamed up 
with militiamen and local businessmen interested in profiting from the handsome 
bounties paid by the shipping companies. The illegal fishing problem is a source of 
disappointment and anger for many Somali people and the pirates capitalize on the local 
population’s disdain for foreign fishing in their waters and use it to legitimize their 
attacks. The Department for International Development (DFID) estimated that Somalia 
lost nearly $100 million dollars from 2003-2004 due to illegal tuna and shrimp fishing in 
the country’s economic exclusive zone (Ploch et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, it is suggested that Asian and European companies have exploited 
Somali’s political instability by signing contracts with non-recognized government 
entities enabling them to dump toxic chemicals into the waters in the region. The United 
Nations Environmental program (UNEP) reported a storm had washed up rusting barrels 
containing toxic chemicals onto the shores of Somalia. A United Nations (UN) envoy 
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reported to Al-Jazeera that European and Asian countries signed dumping contracts with 
the administration in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland and warlords in southern 
Somalia (Al-Mutairi Abdulaziz, 2009). The official also stated, “Somalia has been used 
as a dumping ground for hazardous waste staring in the early 1990s, and continuing 
through the civil war there…what is most alarming here is that nuclear waste is being 
dumped…radioactive uranium waste that is potentially killing Somalis and completely 
destroying the ocean” (Al-Mutairi Abdulaziz, 2009, p. 1). Libyan leader and African 
Union chairman, Muammar Ghaddafi argues, “it [piracy] is a response to greedy western 
nations who invade and exploit Somalia’s water resources illegally. It is not piracy it is 
self defense. It is defending the Somali children’s food….Somalis are reacting for justice 
and trying to defend their country against exploitation of resources” (Anonymous, 2009, 
p. 1). 
The two theories suggest that piracy stems from a lack of social welfare and 
governance associated with a successful state. The absence of an authority figure or body 
of oversight allows for the exploitation of Somalia’s water resources and promotes a 
dysfunctional social system on land. This combination drives Somali’s to commit crimes 
on the high seas. Whether it is justified as self defense or a desperate measure to support 
groups economic well being it is still a criminal activity and must be treated as such. 
“The international Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) stated at 
its inaugural meeting that piracy is symptomatic of the overall situation in Somalia 
including the prevalence of illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping off the coast of 
Somalia, which adversely affects the Somali economy and marine environment” (Ploch et 
al., 2009, p. 7). Prince Saud Al-Faisal, of Saudi Arabia said: "Piracy, like terrorism, is a 
disease which is against everybody, and everybody must address it together" 
(Glendinning & Rice, 2008, p. 1).  
D. PIRATE NETWORKS 
In order to effectively disrupt pirate organizations it is extremely important to 
understand how the networks operate and their organizational structures. Current open 
source intelligence suggests pirate networks operate in ways similar to what the Federal 
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Bureau of Investigation (FBI) describes as organized crime. Organized crime, as opposed 
to ordinary gangs, terrorist groups, or guerilla organizations, is defined as “any group 
having some manner of a formalized structure and whose primary objective is to obtain 
money through illegal activities. Such groups maintain their position through the use of 
actual or threatened violence, corrupt public officials, graft, or extortion, and generally 
have a significant impact on the people in their locales, region, or the country as a whole” 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008). The evidence suggests Somali pirates operate in 
the same manner as traditional organized crime networks in that they: (1) are financially 
motivated; (2) receive support from local government officials; (3) utilize violence or the 
threat of violence to further their objectives; and (4) have a significant impact on the local 
populace.  
The actual organization of the groups, including their social hubs, nodes, and 
links, and how the groups communicate socially, proves much more difficult to assess. A 
Danish Institute for International Studies report notes that there is actually very little 
known about the specific motives of the pirates, and even less known about the social 
structure of the pirate networks (Moller, 2009a). Most of the difficulty in assessing the 
social structures of pirate networks is due to the lack of intelligence and information 
available regarding the internal affairs of the area in which pirates operate and the 
networks and clans from which they emerge. In fact, Stig Hansen, an expert on Somalia, 
describes it as a “black hole when it comes to information” (p. 2). This lack of knowledge 
proves extremely problematic in attempting to identify the networks size, leadership, and 
other organization characteristics; however, an attempt will be made to describe the 
network based on the analysis of several intelligence and news sources. 
Consistent with the FBI’s definition of an organized criminal enterprise, pirate 
networks are financially motivated. It can be easily assessed that prospective pirates 
perform a simple cost benefit analysis when they consider joining a pirate network. 
Somalia is one of the world’s poorest countries, with up to 73% of the population living 
on less that $2 a day (United Nations World Food Programme). Therefore, the prospect 
of a financial reward totaling in the millions of dollars provides the incentive for Somalis 
who join pirate gangs, “whose wealth and strength often make them part of the local 
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social and economic elite,” to pursue a career in commercial ship piracy (Hunter, 2008, p. 
1). The pirates are willing to assume the risk of capture or being killed in exchange for 
the chance at a monetary reward that will enable them to live in luxury relative to the rest 
of the Somali population. A successful raid on a merchant ship can net a pirate many 
thousands of dollars after the ransom is split between all actors involved in the attack. A 
memo prepared by the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee in 
early March 2009 said of Somali piracy, “it is very much a business…one captured pirate 
explained how the ransom – on average $1 million to $2 million per boat – is divided 
among participants. Twenty percent goes to the bosses of the group, 20 percent is capital 
investment, to include guns, ammunition, fuel, food, cigarettes, and other provisions for 
future missions, 30 percent in bribes to government officials” (Associated Press, 2009a). 
Once a group of pirates achieves success and reaps the financial reward it is very difficult 
to infiltrate and break up because as BBC reporter, Ahmed Mohamed Ali explains, the 
pirates run a tight operation that has little infighting because “the promise of money 
keeps them together” (Hunter, 2008, p. 1). 
Also consistent with the FBI’s definition of organized crime are the involvement 
of corrupt public officials and the use of graft and extortion to further the objectives of 
the network. A number of open sources suggest that public officials in the “small, distinct 
port towns,” harboring pirates are woven into the pirates’ framework (Ploch et al., 2009, 
p. 8). These local and regional officials provide the support necessary for pirates to carry 
out the attacks and ensure the gangs are free from the prospect of prosecution or capture 
on land.  
Two of the primary groups involved in recent attacks are a network based in the 
Puntland region district of Eyl and a network based in the Mudug region district of 
Harardera (Xarardheere) (Ploch et al., 2009, p. 8). It is also reported that several smaller 
groups operate from the Somali ports of Bosaso, Qandala, Caluula, Bargaal, Hobyo, 
Mogadishu, and Garad (Ploch et al., 2009, p. 8). The group operating out of Puntland, 
home of the Darod clan (Nicoll & Johnstone, 2009) and one of Somalia’s poorest areas, 
is recognized as one of the most problematic networks (Middleton, 2008, p. 5).  It is in 
this region where speculation abounds regarding the involvement of public officials in 
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piracy. The pirates “rely on a local network of corrupt officials and villagers eager for 
money in a region with no real economy...rogue security and government officials there 
allow the pirates to use ports and move freely around towns while they restock ships” 
(Hassan & Kennedy, 2008, p. 1). Given the number of people involved in the industry, it 
has become a “mainstay of the Puntland economy” (Harper, 2008, p. 1). BBC News notes 
“the coastal region of Puntland is booming,” and the prospect of sharing in the profits 
brings many to Eyl after a hijacking (Harper, 2008, p. 1). It also provides the motivation 
for those who support and tolerate piracy in the region.  
In addition, “the Office of the UN General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon accused the 
administration of semi-autonomous region in North-East Somalia called Puntland for 
sponsoring piracy” (Al-Mutairi, 2009a, p. 1). Some even suggest the President of the 
region, President Abdullahi Yusuf is involved in pirate activities. As one expert said, 
“money will go to Yusuf as a gesture of goodwill to a regional leader – so even if the 
higher echelons of Somali government and clan structure are not directly involved in 
organizing piracy, they probably do benefit” (Middleton, 2008, p. 5). Additional 
suspicious circumstances tying President Yusuf to pirate operations is involvement of his 
cousin in previous pirate activities and a shootout regarding pirate money that occurred in 
Garrowe, the capital of Puntland in March 2005 (Hansen, 2006, p. 13). With the help and 
support of these government co-conspirators the “pirates operate across Puntland freely, 
which shows the support they get from the administration…they are treated as heroes. 
One of the pirates, Liban Omer, said that pirating is very much common in Puntland and 
even police are pirates” (Al-Mutairi, 2009b, p. 1).  
It is also clear that pirate organizations utilize violence or the threat of violence to 
maintain their position of power. The most common tactic of pirates is to harass their 
target vessel with small arms and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fire aimed towards the 
wheelhouse in order to force the ship to bare steerageway or stop. This enables the pirates 
to board the ship and seize control. These armed takeovers are extremely dangerous to 
the crew and sometimes volatile cargo onboard the ship. The weapons utilized in these 
attacks are becoming increasingly more dangerous. “Five to six years ago, when pirates 
attacked, they used machetes, knives, and pistols. Today they come equipped with AK-
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47s, M-16s, rifle grenades, and RPGs” (Chalk, 2008, p. 14). These weapons originate in 
the black markets of Africa, Asia, and Europe and the ready access to them is making the 
pirates evermore bold and violent (Chalk, 2008). The proliferation of these weapons and 
the intimidation they provide towards shipping crews and local populace enables the 
pirates to maintain their dominant position in the region as is true with organized crime 
syndicates.  
Regarding the FBIs assessment of organized crime affecting the local populace, 
piracy has definitely done so in the small port towns they operate from. The pirates’ 
economic success has had both positive and negative effects on the population in 
Puntland and other areas with operating gangs.  Moreover, the pirates “seem to enjoy a 
certain fame and popularity in their respective communities” (Moller, 2009a). Although 
the pirate’s on-shore spending has had positive effects on the economic situation in 
certain regions, bringing jobs and transforming areas into “veritable boomtowns”, there 
has been criticism as well.  One resident of Eyl said, “this piracy has a negative impact on 
several aspects of our life in Garowe,” noting an escalating lack of security due to 
“hundreds of armed men” who come to join the pirates and the growing use of drugs and 
alcohol attributed to the pirate. (Harper, 2008, p. 1). Life is also made more expensive for 
ordinary Somalis because of the fluctuations in exchange rate due to the United States 
dollars being introduced into the economy (Hunter, 2008). In fact, the price of a kilogram 
of Khat, the drug of choice for many young people in Somalia, has increased over tenfold 
in the past two years (Nicoll & Johnstone, 2009). The inflationary effects of the ransom 
money are causing Somali’s not involved in piracy financial hardships and making their 
lives increasingly difficult.  
The size of pirate organizations is also relatively unknown, however estimates put 
the number of pirates in the thousands, and the East African Seafarers’ Association and 
the House Armed Services Committee agree that there are at least five well-organized 
pirate groups conducting most of the attacks in Somalia (Associated Press, 2009a).  Most 
of the gangs are comprised of young men ages 15–25 years old that are recruited from 
“large provincial clans, which are extended family networks that divided themselves into 
smaller sub-clans” (Associated Press, 2009a, p. 1). The composition of these clans 
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usually includes: (1) local fishermen, who are considered the brains of the operation, and 
have the skill and knowledge of the sea; (2) ex-militiamen, who previously fought for the 
local clan warlords and provide the muscle; and (3) technical experts that operate the high 
tech equipment for the cells, such as satellite phones and GPS units (Hunter, 2008).  
In addition to the actual pirates themselves, there exists a sophisticated 
“international network that feeds information from ports in the Gulf, Europe and Asia 
back to Somalia” (Middleton, 2008, p. 3). The support networks are mostly informal, 
existing along family or clan lines (Hassan & Kennedy, 2008). These co-conspirators 
provide anything from financial support, shipping information, and logistical support to 
weapons, marketing of stolen goods, money exchange, and housing and food for the 
captured sailors aboard pirated vessels. In exchange, the investors receive a portion of the 
ransom monies received by the pirates. Michael Weinstein, a Somalia expert at Purdue 
University said of the network, “the Somali diasporas all around the world now have 
taken to this business enterprise…it resembles a syndicate where you buy shares, so to 
speak, and you get a cut of the ransom” (Hassan & Kennedy, 2008, p. 1). 
Disruption of the pirate organizations requires an understanding of how the 
groups operate and organize. Operationally, pirate networks closely resemble what the 
United State Federal Bureau of Investigation describes as organized crime. The pirates 
groups are financially motivated; involve corrupt local government officials; utilize 
violence or the threat of violence to maintain their position; and have a significant impact 
on the local populace. Organizationally, pirate networks are most likely composed of five 
large gangs, totaling nearly 1,000 operatives. These gangs are supported by a large, 
international support network stretching from Africa to North America (Hassan & 
Kennedy, 2008). The analysis and understanding of this information provides further 
insights on how pirate networks may be disrupted and eliminated using trust and 
influence techniques. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided the reader with a brief overview of the history of Somalia, 
its people, and their governments. In addition, open source information was used to 
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describe the operational and organizational structures of pirate networks. The purpose of 
these descriptions was to provide insights on where trust and influence operations can be 
injected to disrupt pirate networks. These techniques are described in Chapter IV and 
utilize information outlined in this chapter. 
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III. CURRENT AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO SOMALI 
PIRACY AND THEIR ASSOCIATED LIMITATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States and the international community have adopted a wide range of 
defensive responses to the piracy in the Gulf of Aden; however, none of these responses 
address root causes that allow piracy to flourish. According to piracy experts Roger 
Middleton and Stephanie Hanson, there are several options available to the international 
community to combat the symptoms piracy. Current and proposed solutions include: (1) 
establishing a naval presence; (2) establishing a coastguard for Somalia; (3) utilizing 
onboard deterrents and shipboard countermeasures (Hanson, 2009, p. 2); (4) instituting 
regional anti-piracy patrols; (5) paying no ransoms; (6) and doing nothing (Middleton, 
2008, p. 11). A number of these methods are presently utilized and many have been 
attempted in the past, however, they have failed to disrupt or deter pirate attacks. This 
chapter seeks to summarize the aforementioned methodologies for preventing pirate 
attacks, their limitations, and the reasons they have not been successful.  
B. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NAVAL PRESENCE 
Since January 2009, more than a dozen countries including Russia, France, the 
United Kingdom, India, China, and the United States deployed warships to the Gulf of 
Aden to combat piracy. All told, nearly thirty warships were patrolling an area of nearly 
2.5 million square miles in an attempt to protect commercial vessels, their cargo, and the 
nearly 12% of annual crude oil shipments that passes through the region (Hanson, 2009). 
The naval presence was initiated to deter piracy in support of United Nations (UN) 
Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, and 1846, which were adopted by the United Nations 
Security Council in 2008 (European Union, 2008). The efforts include Coalition Task 
Force 150 (CTF 150), the European Union (EU) naval operation against piracy (EU 
NAVFOR Somalia), and Coalition Task Force 151 (CTF 151). 
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United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1814, 1816, 1838, 1846, 
and most recently 1851 set the stage for the current anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of 
Aden. Resolution 1846 (2008) declared that “during the next 12 months States and 
regional organizations cooperating with the Somali Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) may enter Somalia’s territorial waters and use ‘all necessary means’ – such as 
deploying naval vessels and military aircraft, as well as seizing and disposing of boats, 
vessels, arms and related equipment used for piracy – to fight piracy and armed robbery 
at sea off the Somali coast, in accordance with relevant international law” (United 
Nations, 2008a, p. 1). Resolution 1851 expanded upon UNSCR 1846 by allowing those 
countries involved in anti-piracy operations to “undertake all necessary measures 
appropriate in Somalia, to interdict those using Somali territory to plan, facilitate or 
undertake such acts,” allowing member nations to pursue pirates onto the shores of 
Somalia (United Nations, 2008b, p. 1). 
The naval phase of anti-piracy operations began in August 2008, when the 
operational commander of Coalition Task Force 150 (CTF 150), Canadian Commodore 
Bob Davidson, established “a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) to act as a 
protected sea lane through which commercial vessels could enjoy the protection of these 
warships and their air assets” (Lennox, 2008, p. 12). The naval assets were intended to 
escort commercial vessels along a standard route, which would deter pirates through the 
show of force and make it easier for international forces to respond to distress calls 
(Middleton, 2008, p. 10). However, “preliminary data indicates the pirate success rate for 
hijacking is only slightly lower inside the MSPA than outside” (National Security 
Council, 2008, p. 8). 
Shortly after the MSPA was established and the arrival of CTF 150, the European 
Union dispatched a military contingency to the area under the auspices of EU NAVFOR 
Somalia – Operation Atalanta. Operation Atalanta’s aim is to “protect the vessels of the 
World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food and aid to displaced persons in Somalia; 
provide protection for merchant vessels; employ the necessary measures, including the 
use of force, to deter prevent and intervene in order to bring an end to acts of armed 
robbery and piracy” (European Union, 2008). The EU operation is scheduled to last for 
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12 months with support expiring in December 2009. At the time of this writing, no 
further plans have been established to extend the mission, which places the security of 
WFP delivery ships at risk of attack.   
In January 2009, Coalition Maritime Forces stood up Combined Task Force 151 
to “act as a separate maritime command from CTF 150 for the Red Sea – Gulf of Aden – 
Arabian Sea region with a mandate focused solely on counter-piracy operations” 
(Lennox, 2008, p. 12). CTF 151 is comprised of 20 warships and an assortment of air 
assets including helicopters, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), and fixed wing aircraft, 
all tasked with patrolling the region and providing security for commercial shipping 
vessels (Lennox, 2008). Naval analysts suggest “that the new task force will allow the 
United States to seek a non-Western approach to counter piracy by partnering with 
Eastern navies,” which may increase the legitimacy of the mission in the eyes of the 
global community and highlight piracy as an international issue, not solely a burden for 
western nations (Hanson, 2009, p. 2). 
The establishment of a naval presence has been marginally successful at deterring 
pirate attacks. While it has almost certainly made target selection more difficult for 
pirates, and statistically has reduced the number of attacks by 22% from August to 
October 2008 (Hanson, 2009) (some attribute the decrease in attacks to rough seas and 
bad weather rather than the increased naval presence) (Wadhams, 2009), there are 
numerous limitations to suppressing piracy with a naval presence.  
First, and foremost, the threat area for piracy extends nearly 2.8 million square 
kilometers. The naval assets required to effectively police such an area is well beyond the 
scope of any assets pledged by the Coalition Maritime Forces. Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that the establishment of the MSPA makes the targeting of commercial vessels 
easier for pirate vessels. A senior naval commander explained, “The pirates will just 
change their tactics…and it fails to reduce the danger for ships steaming north-south 
rather than east-west” (Middleton, 2008, p. 10). The successes of the November 2008 
hijacking of a Saudi oil supertanker and the April 2009 hijacking of the U.S. flagged 
Maersk Alabama highlight the limitations and difficulties associated with policing such a 
large body of water with a relatively small force. Additionally, supplying such a large 
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force is prohibitively expensive and possibly disproportionate relative to the monetary 
costs associated with piracy in the region. The international community, especially the 
United States and the European Union, are expending exhorbent amounts of resources on 
a problem that takes root inside of Somalia. 
Furthermore, current anti-piracy efforts are defensive in nature. “Somali pirates, 
unless they are caught in the midst of a hijacking, are not fired upon, nor are they being 
attacked in their home ports. Warships are being used for the purpose of protecting 
commercial vessels in the region from attack; they are not attacking the pirates 
themselves” (Lennox, 2008, p. 13). The main reason behind a defensive stance and 
limited engagement is the “international human rights regime” (Lennox, 2008, p. 13). 
The human rights activists make it extremely difficult for Western nations and their allies 
to take kinetic action to kill pirates, destroy their vessels and equipment, and deny them 
safe haven. The demands for an internationally recognized fair trial for pirate suspects, 
even though a venue may not exist for such action, has made the prosecution of pirates 
extremely difficult.  
An additional limitation of a naval presence is the Somali pirates do not fear death 
or capture. Death and violence are an integral part of their lives and piracy provides a 
means to gain a significant economic advantage over their peers with nearly the same risk 
of dying as remaining on the streets of their homeland. Abdi Timo-Jile, a pirate from the 
central city of Garowe, said of the anti-piracy effort, “we people are not afraid. There is 
death every day” (Wadhams, 2009, p. 1). Hence, a large naval force is unlikely to deter 
criminals who are desperate for money and have been exposed to violence and death all 
of their lives. 
A naval response only serves to treat symptoms of a problem that is rooted on 
land. Martin Murphy describes the response as “the least efficient and cost-effective form 
of piracy suppression” (Murphy, 2009, p. 3). A more suitable response should seek to 
address the problem’s cause or disrupt it at its core. Most experts agree that once the 
navies exit the area, “it is likely that piracy will surge again, particularly if Somali 
remains unstable” (Hanson, 2009, p. 2). 
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C. ESTABLISHING A SOMALI COAST GUARD 
It has been suggested that Somalia establish a Coast Guard to combat piracy. 
Roger Middleton states, “Navies are not designed for dealing with criminals, they are 
designed for fighting wars…in the absence of a police force inside Somalia, this may be 
the best way of doing it” (Hanson, 2009, p. 2). The force would be responsible for 
patrolling the waters off the coast and protecting the country’s water resources from 
illegal activity. In theory, an indigenous coastal patrol force sounds like a viable solution 
to the piracy problem; however, when one considers the ongoing political and economic 
turmoil inside the country, the idea becomes tremendously challenging. It is extremely 
unlikely the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) could financially support such a 
force nor could it protect those brave enough to take on the duty of becoming 
coastguardsmen. An external international governing body such as the United Nations 
(UN) or the African Union (AU) would have to run the organization due to the 
weaknesses associated with the TFG. Moreover, a Somali Coast Guard would require 
external funding, possibly generated by fishing revenues or provided by international 
shipping companies. Companies may be unwilling to provide the financial support 
necessary for such a large endeavor, and the TFG could certainly not afford it on its own 
(Middleton, 2008). 
The idea of establishing a Somali Coast Guard may be too progressive at the 
current moment due to the instability of the country. It would be very difficult to “find 
qualified individuals within Somalia and to determine how to hand over such a body to 
the Somali government” and find an international body willing to support such a difficult 
task, thus leaving it susceptible to failure and corruption as is typical with Somali 
government establishments (Hanson, 2009, p. 3). 
D. THE UTILIZATION OF ONBOARD DETERRENTS AND SHIPBOARD 
COUNTERMEASURES 
International shipping companies have taken internal measures to prevent the 
hostile takeover of their vessels. These measures include active and passive security 
measures. Active measures include utilizing “rudimentary devices such as fire hoses, 
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deck patrols, or even carpet tacks to repel pirates…or more sophisticated means such as 
nonlethal electric screens or fences with loudspeaker systems that emit a pitch so painful 
it keeps the pirates away” (Hanson, 2009, p. 2). Passive measures, as recommended by 
the United States Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa Partnership and Action Plan 
include: operating at the fastest speeds possible; changing course repeatedly and 
conducting nighttime transits; modification of vessel structures to preventing or delaying 
pirates from gaining vessel control if boarded; conducting training and certifications for 
professional shipboard security consultants and third party security providers; 
encouraging the embarkation of unarmed, certified consultants to provide intelligence 
reports, night vision equipment and non-lethal security force; and paying careful attention 
to warnings and areas where attacks are prevalent (National Security Council, 2008).  
There are many limitations regarding onboard deterrents and shipboard 
countermeasures including: cost – deterrents such as acoustic emitters and ship structure 
modifications are extremely expensive; crew incentive – there is a lack of incentive for 
the crewmembers to be proactive since in most cases pirates pose little threat to the crew; 
legal and ethical issues – shipping companies are hesitant to arm their crews due to the 
dangers associated with firearms onboard ship, insurance restrictions, and maritime and 
territorial laws preventing firearms onboard ships. In addition, the use of these devices 
and tactics may only further embolden pirates and put ship crews at greater risk of 
retribution. Further, this type of tactic is strictly defensive in nature and does not address 
affect the ability of pirates to conduct future attacks. 
E. INSTITUTING REGIONAL ANTI-PIRACY PATROLS 
Experts have suggested the creation of a regional anti-piracy task force led by 
Middle Eastern and Eastern African countries. The task force patrols would cover the 
coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden and would attempt to accomplish the same tasks 
as the Coalition Maritime Forces currently operating in the area. (Hanson, 2009, p. 2) 
These experts propose that “such patrols could be modeled on those that the navies of 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand conducted in the Malacca Strait” (Hanson,  
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2009, p. 2). In addition, the group suggested the creation of a regional counter piracy 
coordination center, much like the one that exists in Southeast Asia that is credited  
with reducing piracy attacks (Hanson, 2009). 
This solution utilizes a methodology similar to the UN mandated Maritime 
Coalition that is currently operating in the area and is subject to many of the same 
shortcoming and limitations associated with it. In addition, the proposition that it will 
have similar effects to the Southeast Asian effort may be presumptuous. The area in 
which the Southeast Asian cooperative operates is much smaller and more constrained 
and the countries involved possess significantly more resources than those of Eastern 
Africa. Furthermore, a regional security cooperative assumes the countries involved are 
provided an incentive for participating and are willing to work together to solve the 
problem. While the monetary incentive exists, the willingness and ability to form a 
functioning cooperative between East African and Middle Eastern countries and the 
availability of the necessary resources to do so come into question. Many East African 
countries such as the Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Kenya are suffering from their own 
economic and political problems and may not be willing to take on the additional burdens 
of anti-piracy. 
F. PAYING NO RANSOMS 
Discontinuing or denying pirates request for ransom payments has been suggested 
by a number of international shipping companies (Middleton, 2008). This approach 
would, in theory, decrease the incentive to participate in pirate activities. However, as 
Middleton points out, there are two problems associated with this propositions: (1) 
Pirates would continue to attack commercial vessels and copy the tactics used in 
Indonesia and other places, and would look not to ransoms for the economic incentive, 
but to the hijacked vessel itself. The pirates would steal the vessel, re-register it, creating 
a phantom ship, and then use the ship to carry new cargo and subsequently steal it. (2) If 
shipping companies discontinue the payments, it could result in the execution of hostage 
crew members and lead to a further escalation in violence (Middleton, 2008). Paying no 
ransoms is not a feasible solution to the Somali piracy problem. It would only seek to 
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exacerbate the situation or cause the pirates to alter their tactics and seek monetary gain 
through some other means utilizing the hijacked vessels. It may even drive the pirates to 
seek allegiances with extremist organizations to fill the monetary void left by cessation of 
ransom payments.   
G. TAKING NO ACTION 
The international community could choose to do nothing about the piracy 
problem. As Chatham House’s Middleton states, “accepting the only real solution lies in 
a political solution inside Somalia, the international community could calculate some 
forty ships captured out of 16,000 is such a small number that the resources required to 
protect them would be wasted” (Middleton, 2008, p. 12). However, this solution would 
contradict the ideals that make the issue of piracy an issue of international concern such 
as the potential for an environmental disaster, the linkage of pirates and Islamic 
extremists, and the rise in prices of consumer goods and oil due to the increased shipping 
costs brought on by insurance and ship seizures (Middleton, 2008). 
H. CONCLUSION 
As evidenced by the continuation of attempted and actual hijackings in the 
vicinity of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, the current solutions to piracy have not been 
effective. Additionally, several of the proposed solutions possess drawbacks thereby 
limiting their efficacy. The major problem with the current solutions and alternative 
suggestions is that the majorities of them are defensive in nature and do little to address 
the actual roots of the problems, which stem from the political instability inside Somalia. 
British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston, as quoted by Martin Murphy, referred to a 
naval solution to slavery as “taking a wasp’s nest…is more effective than catching wasps 
one by one” (Murphy, 2009, p. 3). For all intensive purposes the current solutions are 
attempting to do just that, catch the pirates one a time, until the problem ceases to exist. A 
more effective solution would target the problem on shore and attempt to break up the 
pirate networks. The utilization of trust and influence techniques carefully inserted into 
the organizations and their support networks could potentially achieve success where 
previous methods have failed. 
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IV. UNDERMINING TRUST TO COMBAT PIRACY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an overview of the concept of trust and its importance in 
Somali pirate networks. It introduces approaches to disrupt or undermine Somali piracy 
by exploiting the trust necessary for this type of organization to operate. These 
approaches are based upon the analysis of the Somali piracy problem conducted in 
Chapters II and III and on operations that have been successful at disrupting criminal 
organizations in the past. The methods of disruption discussed here seek to disrupt the 
command and control structures of the networks or increase the uncertainty regarding 
trust-based relationships needed to support the organization. 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUST IN PIRATE NETWORKS 
Trust, as defined by Piotr Sztompka (1999), “is a bet about the future contingent 
actions of others” (p. 25). Sztompka argues it is an essential element when faced with an 
uncertain or uncontrollable future and allows one “to act in spite of uncertainty and risk” 
(Sztompka, 1999, p. 25). Organized criminal organizations, such as the Mafia or a 
network of Somali pirates, operate in an environment where the consequences and risks 
associated with their illegal actions are extremely high. Actors within these organizations 
face risks such as prosecution or violence in order to carry on their criminal enterprises. 
Furthermore, there are numerous uncertainties involved in their illegal activity. For 
example, traitors may be working with the authorities to reveal the illegal actions of their 
co-conspirators or taking actions that benefit themselves at the expense of their 
associates. For this reason, the actors in this type of organization must rely upon trust to 
ensure their co-conspirators are acting to carry out explicit or implicit agreements 
towards the goals of the organization. These actors must be willing to bet that the future 
actions and intentions of their associates correspond with the goals and objectives of the 
organization as a whole. Any deviation from the standard operating procedures or agreed 
upon actions may result in negative consequences for the individual or the organization. 
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The extent to which this trust manifests itself throughout the network as a whole or 
between specific individuals and groups may vary based on past actions or one’s position 
within the organization; however, the concept of trust must exist to some extent for the 
organization to achieve its objectives.  
Sztompka (1999) also argues that contemporary societies are heavily reliant on 
trust to function and there are “unique features of contemporary societies that give 
particular salience to the problematics of trust” (Sztompka, 1999, p. 11). He suggests that 
the increased complexity in contemporary networks due to globalization and the 
proliferation of technology increases the need for society to rely on trust to function. He 
presents a general framework regarding the role of trust in a contemporary society and 
suggests there are unique features of contemporary society that make trust essential 
including: increased interdependence; the pervasiveness of technology and development; 
ever-increasing opportunities and options available to people; and the increased opacity 
of organizations (Sztompka, 1999).   
Just as society has evolved and become increasingly complex so have smaller 
sub-sets of the society. One of those subsets is that of the Somali pirates. As the 
phenomena of Somali piracy grew from a few local warlords acting to secure Somalia’s 
water resources from illegal foreign activity to a sophisticated global network of co-
conspirators and supporters, the pirates, like society as a whole, became an increasingly 
complex entity. In order to stress the importance of the manifestation of trust within 
Somali pirate networks, it is useful to apply Sztompka’s general theory on the unique 
features of trust in contemporary societies to pirate networks. 
1. Increased Interdependence 
As discussed in Chapter II, the Somali pirates have managed to weave a global 
web of co-conspirators and supporters who are interested in benefitting from the ransoms 
generated by piracy in the Horn of Africa. This global support network provides the 
monetary, material, and informational support necessary for the pirates to carry out their 
attacks. The pirates heavily rely upon the division of labor provided by this large network 
of individuals involved in piracy, and as Sztompka (1999) suggests this “division of labor 
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increases the vulnerability to others’ failures to fulfill their responsibilities…and as our 
dependence on the cooperation of others grows, so does the importance of trust in their 
reliability” (p. 12).  
2. The Pervasiveness of Technology and Development 
The analysis of modern day piracy also revealed that pirates place an increasing 
reliance on technology to carry out their operations. They routinely use Global 
Positioning System (GPS), satellite phones, and sophisticated money counting machines 
to aid in the planning and execution of the attacks. Richard Stivers, author of The Culture 
of Cynicism, as quoted by Sztompka (1999), says of the ubiquity of technology, “the 
complex interactions of technology as they bear upon nature and society create an ever 
larger number of unintended consequences…apart from their uncontestable benefits, have 
also produced vast possibilities for disastrous failures, as well as harmful side effects” (p. 
13). The increasing social and technological complexity increases the probability of 
failure and “coping with that raised vulnerability in the risk society requires an enlarged 
pool of trust” (Sztompka, 1999, p. 13). 
3. The Increasing Number of Options in all Aspects of Life 
The increased scope and number of individuals involved in pirate operations also 
adds to the number of options or choices available to all actors in the organization. Along 
with this increasing number of options or alternatives available to actors within these 
organizations comes the need for increased reliance on trust (Sztompka, 1999).  Gambetta 
says of this phenomena, “trust becomes increasingly salient for our decisions and actions 
the larger the feasible set of alternatives open to others” (Sztompka, 1999).  
4. The Increased Opacity of Organizations 
Contemporary Somali pirate organizations also face what Sztompka refers to as 
organizational opacity. When an institution, organization, or technological system 
becomes more complex and global, they become “impenetrable to ordinary people” 
(Sztompka, 1999, p. 13). People no longer have an intimate knowledge of the persons or 
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entities they rely on to make important decisions necessary for everyday life. “More often 
than ever before we have to act in the dark, as if facing a huge black box, on the proper 
functioning of which our needs and interests increasingly depend. Trust becomes an 
indispensible strategy to deal with the opaqueness of our social environment. Without 
trust we would be paralyzed and unable to act” (Sztompka, 1999, p. 13).  
By applying Sztompka’s general theory of unique features of trust in 
contemporary society to pirate organizations, it becomes apparent that trust is an essential 
element in their operations. As the Somali pirate networks have become more 
sophisticated and spread globally, they must place a heavier reliance on the actions of 
individuals and technological systems. Individual actors may or may not possess 
firsthand knowledge of the individuals in their support networks and therefore must rely 
on trust to ensure that activities are carried out as necessary. They must bet that the future 
actions of their co-conspirators coincide with the interests of the organization as a whole.  
For the purposes of this thesis, the interest lies in undermining the trust that 
Somali pirates place in their support networks or purposefully injecting clues that create 
distrust within the pirate organizations. Sztompka (1999) defines distrust as, “the 
negative mirror image of trust. It is also a bet, but a negative bet. It involves negative 
expectations about the actions of others” (Sztompka, 1999).  Because these negative 
expectations or actions conflict with the interests and objectives of the organization or 
network as a whole, they interfere with the networks’ ability or capacity to operate. In 
order to inject the information necessary to create distrust, it is necessary to use 
communication channels provided by the network.  The increasing scope and complexity 
of pirate operations has left a large number of channels open for exploitation. 
C. TRUST AND INFLUENCE TECHNIQUES TO DISRUPT SOMALI 
PIRACY 
The techniques described below seek to degrade the Somali pirates’ operational 
and organizational capacities by undermining the trust-based relationships necessary for 
the network to function, thereby impeding their abilities to conduct attacks.  These 
techniques were generated based upon examples of disruption techniques that have been 
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successful at disrupting criminal organizations in the past or through the historical 
analysis of the piracy problem conducted in Chapter II. Unlike the current efforts to 
combat piracy these solutions seek to disrupt piracy at the roots of the organization rather 
than treating symptoms of the problem. 
1. Undermine the Trust between Pirates and the Somali Population 
The relationship between the Somali pirates and the general populace in which 
they reside is extremely important. As noted in Chapter II, in pirate towns such as Eyl 
and Garowe, the pirates depend on the local populace to provide support and services for 
their operations. The populace provides food and shelter for the pirates and their 
hostages. In addition, their silence and lack of cooperation with the TFG and anti-piracy 
forces regarding pirate operations provides protection for pirates. The cooperation with 
the pirates makes the general populace an integral part of the pirate’s support network.  
The pirates, in turn, place a large amount of trust in these citizens that directly or 
indirectly support piracy. The pirates trust they will continue to provide the necessary 
logistical support for continued operations and that they will not cooperate with 
authorities to identify key members of the network. By applying Sztompka’s general 
theory of trust in contemporary societies to pirates and the general population, the 
following observations are noted: (1) the pirates rely on the increased interdependence 
and division of labor provided by the general population; and (2) the increased number of 
individuals creates an abundance of decision making options and sets of alternatives for 
every actor in the network, thereby increasing the need for trust.  
A successful strategy to undermine the trust between pirates and the Somali 
population should influence the population to cease support activities, make decisions 
contrary to the interests of the pirates, and possibly cause a public outcry of contempt 
towards the criminals. But, as John Arquilla asks, “how do you attack a trust structure – 
which is what a network is” (Garreau, 2001, p. 1) To begin undermining the trust within 
the community, a method suggested by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1996) is to “paint the 
enemy with PR ugly paint so that they seem beyond the pale, ridiculous, alien, maniacal, 
  46
inexplicable” (Garreau, 2001, p. 6). By controlling the story, it is possible to delegitimize 
the operations of a network and turn the general populace against the pirates. 
However, the current story told by some of the local Somali media portrays the 
pirates as heroic characters seeking to further the objectives of the Somali people. Most 
sources note the pirates’ altruistic motives - protecting Somalia’s coastlines from illegal 
fishing and toxic waste dumping and refer to the pirates by such names as the “National 
Volunteer Coastguard” (Moller, 2009a). The local population is routinely told of the 
millions of dollars brought into the local economies and how the money has invigorated 
the local economy.  In addition, many sources note that the threats, damages and losses 
due to piracy are greatly exaggerated. The media frequently mentions the humane, 
civilized treatment afforded to their hostages and the high quality of food they are 
provided. These messages detract from the fact that piracy is dangerous and criminal.  
Additionally, as noted in Chapter II, the financial rewards generated by pirate 
attacks have had a tremendous inflationary effect on the goods and services in the areas 
where piracy flourishes. For example, the price of a kilogram of Khat, the drug of choice 
for many young Somali men, has increased nearly tenfold in the past two years (Nicoll & 
Johnstone, 2009). Further, the price of other goods and services has also increased to 
reflect the influx of United States dollars and Euros into pirate towns making 
consumables more expensive for ordinary Somalis living in the area. The fact that nearly 
73% of Somalis live on less than two dollars per day and over one million rely on food 
aid creates a large disparity between the living standards of the average person and the 
pirates who live lavishly off the ransoms paid by shipping companies. 
To counter the glorification of piracy, highlight the inflationary effects it causes, 
and undermine the trust between the pirates and the general Somali population, a 
coordinated effort by the Transitional Federal Government and the coalition of nations 
involved in anti-piracy is necessary. The media campaign should utilize any means 
necessary to highlight the negative aspects of piracy to the general population. Radio and 
television broadcasts as well as pamphlets and fliers that could be dropped from airplanes 
and placed in United Nations and USAID food shipments could be used to spread the 
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message to trash piracy. Efforts should be made to portray the pirates as what they 
actually are – criminals that are creating more trouble than good for Somalis. 
By controlling the story of piracy in the media, the anti-piracy coalition can 
highlight the negatives piracy brings to the population and undermine the trust necessary 
due to the division of labor and decision making options for those actors directly or 
indirectly involved in piracy. Without public support, pirates will no longer be able to 
sustain their operations. 
2. Undermine the Pirates Trust in Technology 
As stated in Chapter II, pirate organizations are heavily reliant on technology and 
the services provided by them to carry out their attacks. The pirates make frequent use of 
Global Positioning System (GPS) to identify and track their targets; satellite 
communications devices to reach back to leaders and those directing activities from 
shore; and cellular and internet services to communicate within the organization and with 
their global support networks. Sztompka’s general framework for trust in contemporary 
societies says the integration of technology into society raises the risks and uncertainty 
and leads to increased vulnerability. The vulnerability presented by dependency on such 
devices provides an opportunity to disrupt or degrade the pirates’ command and control 
capability and undermine the trust the pirates place on technological devices. 
Sztompka (1999), when referring to the increased reliance on technology, writes,  
“The principles and mechanisms of their operation are opaque and cryptic for the average 
user. Trust in the multiplicity of abstract systems is a necessary part of everyday life 
today” (Sztompka, 1999, p. 45). Sztompka’s assessment of the opacity of technology is 
applicable to the pirates in that they trust the technological services they rely upon will be 
available and be free from monitoring from authorities. However, due to the complex 
nature of the devices they are using it is unlikely the pirates would be aware the 
technological device had been compromised or bugged by authorities. By making the 
pirates aware they are being monitored or preventing an attack by meeting them at a 
proposed vessel gleamed from signal intelligence (SIGINT), it is possible to undermine 
their trust in technology and force them to communicate by other means,  
thereby reducing their capability to operate. 
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In order to begin to undermine the trust, the pirates place on technology, extensive 
monitoring efforts should be undertaken. By monitoring, disrupting or denying 
communications it might be possible to degrade the ability of the cells to operate. John 
Arquilla, as cited in Garreau (2001) and referring to terrorist networks, says “I would 
attack on the basis of their trust in the command and control structures by which they 
operate...if they believe they are being listened to, they will be inhibited. If we were to 
reduce their trust in their infrastructure, it would drive them to non-technical means – 
force them to keep their heads down more... If you slow them down, interception is more 
likely” (p. 4).  
This type of monitoring has proven useful in disrupting the pirate network in the 
past. At one time, the pirates utilized wire and money transfers to receive ransom monies. 
However, due to the extensive monitoring and tracking efforts put in place by authorities, 
money must now handed over directly (Hunter, 2008). The disruption caused increased 
visibility of the network due to the person-to-person type transfers and allows authorities 
to gain additional information about the activities of pirates. In addition, authorities are 
now afforded the opportunity to place a tracking mechanism within the money to be 
transferred. This might allow them to identify the exact location of pirate sanctuaries and 
gain further information about the network, opening up the possibility of a kinetic strike 
to destroy actors in the network. 
3. Undermine the Relationship between the United Islamic Courts (UIC) 
and Pirates 
The lack of a Somali central authority and pervasive social acceptability of 
piratical actions imply that pirates are free to operate without fear of prosecution or 
outside interference. However, in 2006 the freedom of action was interrupted when 
Islamic militants from the United Islamic Courts (UIC) clashed with pirates citing 
ideological differences. The dispute nearly eradicated piracy in the Horn of Africa for a 
few months.  The UIC and Al-Shabab have made their presence and dislike for pirate 
activities known in the region, and it might be possible to undermine the relationship 
between the two groups, thereby degrading the ability of the pirates to conduct attacks.  
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In regions such as Eyl and Garowe, the absence of the threat of prosecution and 
the accusations of the central authority’s participation in piracy suggest there are no legal 
implications for their illegal actions. However, with the introduction of the violence and 
the threat of violence by the UIC and Al-Shabab, potential pirates must either face the 
violence threatened by the UIC or choose an alternative course of action removing them 
from piratical action. According to Sztompka (1999), “to choose among alternative 
courses of action we often have to resort to trust” (Sztompka, 1999, p. 13). The potential 
pirates either have to trust they will be safe from the UICs violence or they must face the 
additional uncertainty and risk involved with being a pirate. As Sztompka (1999), points 
out, increasing the uncertainty and risk of a situation can force individuals to consider 
other alternative courses of action when faced with an alternate risk profile (p. 38). 
This alternative solution is not without its potential drawbacks. In fact, the 
international community has sought to eliminate the UIC’s influence in the region, 
fearing the proliferation of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the Horn of Africa. In 
2006, under the premises of the Global War on Terror, the United States supported an 
Ethiopian invasion into Somalia to oust the UIC.  However, it might be possible to 
disrupt piracy by temporarily allowing the UIC to vie for power in certain regions in 
Somalia. The power struggle would remove the pirates’ abilities to operate freely and 
make their endeavors much more dangerous, possibly causing would be pirates to choose 
an alternative career option in light of the increased risk profile. 
4. Instill Distrust within Local Pirate Networks 
In September 1964, the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
embarked on a nationwide campaign to disrupt the activities of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). 
The program was initiated following the murders of three New York civil rights workers 
in Mississippi in the summer of 1964. The brutal murders gained the attention of the 
United States Department of Justice and FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover, who directed the 
formation of Operation White Hate Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO). This 
operation sought to “expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize the Ku Klux Klan and  
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specified other hate groups” (Davis, 1992, p. 76). Over a period of several years, 
COINTELPRO was able to reduce the number of active Klansmen from 10,000 to an 
estimated 4,300 (Davis, 1992). 
To accomplish the objectives of Operation White Hate, the FBI developed a series 
of campaigns to instill distrust within the Klan organization. Operating under strict 
secrecy, the FBI slowly undermined the trust within the organization by turning members 
against one another and discrediting Klan leadership. The FBI’s methodologies were 
ultimately successful in breaking long-standing relationships between Klan members and 
the leadership of the organization and undermining their reputation in southern 
communities. 
One of the methods utilized by the FBI was to mail postcards to members 
suggesting that Klan leaders were getting rich off the dues paid by lower-ranking 
members. The cards said, “Which Klan leaders are you spending your money on?” 
(Davis, 1992, p. 78) This method sought to undermine the trust between Klan leadership 
and subordinate members by suggesting that the dues were not going to support the local 
klavern, but instead to support the lavish lifestyles of Klan leadership. The plan worked, 
and soon “disruption and suspicion had been planted within the ranks…and the 
attendance of younger members began to drop. The klavern was, in effect, neutralized” 
(Davis, 1992).  
A similar method might be effective in disrupting Somali pirate networks. The 
anti-piracy coalition could covertly transmit signals to lower ranking members of pirate 
networks that claim an unfair allocation of ransom funds or imply that one member 
possesses a substantial amount of money. Signals such as these could create jealousy and 
create infighting amongst the pirates themselves and with ordinary Somali citizens 
interested in the promise of easy money. It may also create a power struggle, thus 
ultimately degrading the command and control capacity of the network.  
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5. Utilize Captured Pirate Suspects or Co-Conspirators to Create 
Distrust 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1846 and 1851 gave the anti-piracy 
coalition increased leverage to deal with the piracy problem. The ability to pursue pirates 
onto land or capture them at sea presents an opportunity to capture suspected pirates and 
gain useful intelligence. In addition, the anti-piracy coalition might be able to insert 
distrust into the networks, potentially causing degradation in their operational capacity. 
The approach of turning suspected pirates or co-conspirators into informants or 
suspected informants, sometimes referred to by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
as the snitch-jacket approach, has been successful in transmitting disruptive signals in the 
past (Davis, 1992). In both Operation White Hate and Operation Forae, members and 
leaders of the target organization were lead to believe there were informers and spies 
within their network. This created widespread panic and distrust, and caused the network 
to expend vast amounts of resources attempting to find the leak. 
Operation Forae was the brainchild of United States Special Operations Forces. 
The forces had gained intelligence that the North Vietnamese were extremely worried 
about “spy commandos and enemy agents that, in reality, did not exist” (Shultz, 2000p. 
111). The North Vietnamese truly believed there was an ongoing conspiracy “aided and 
abetted by enemy agents…running very deep and being extremely dangerous” (Shultz, 
2000). To the contrary, at the time, the United States was not involved in a widespread 
subversion plan in Northern Vietnam, but it did not take long for U.S. planners to exploit 
the North’s fixation on a non-existent deception operation. 
One of the most useful methods of Operation Forae was the widespread use of a 
snitch-jacket operation code named Project Borden. Project Borden recruited NVA 
prisoners of war as United States agents. The first step was to identify captured prisoners 
of war (POWs) who the team thought would be good candidates to become double 
agents. In reality, the team did not care whether the recruits would make good double 
agents (Shultz, 2000). “It was fully expected and intended that many of the recruited 
agents would reveal their assigned mission to the NVA of their own volition or under 
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interrogation” (Shultz, 2000, p. 114). The goal was to release the prisoners back into the 
North and have them, as well as officials in the North, believe they were part of a large 
double agent organization that was flourishing amongst the Northern ranks. The plan 
worked exactly as intended and ultimately “diverted NVN military resources to counter 
this penetration and started a witchhunt within the ranks of the NVA, resulting in the 
harassment and alienation of NVA troops from their leader, strained NVN ideological 
control and inducement of defection”(Shultz, 2000)(Shultz, 2000, p. 115).  
The latitude given by UNSCR 1846 and 1851 discussed in Chapter III would 
allow a similar type of action against Somali pirates. Anti-piracy forces have been 
granted the power to halt piracy “by any means necessary” and the capture and release of 
suspected pirates at sea is not outside the realm of possibility (United Nations, 2008b).   
6. Increase Pirate Uncertainty Using Decoy Ships 
Sztompka (1999) says contemporary societies must rely on the “growing 
anonymity and impersonality of those on whose actions our existence and well-being 
depend. The managers of institutions and organizations, operators of technological 
systems…and provides of services are most often unknown to us. We usually have no 
possibility of influencing or monitoring their activities…and there is no means of 
bridging this anonymity gap, but resorting to trust” (p. 13). In the case of Somali pirates 
and their potential victims, the anonymity gap is extremely important. The pirates trust in 
the fact the vessel they are targeting is a commercial vessel, carrying, for all intensive 
purposes, unarmed professional mariners who are unlikely to resist a pirate boarding 
attempt. They trust that the decision makers for international shipping companies do not 
arm their sailors and to date each vessel they have attacked has been free of military or 
contract personnel capable of fighting back.  
To exploit or undermine this trust, Coalition Maritime Forces, in conjunction with 
the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), could place combat capable forces 
onboard a vessel that meets the profile of those typically targeted by pirates. This vessel 
would be slow moving, have a low freeboard, and operate far from maritime anti-piracy 
patrols in warning zones as designated by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB). The 
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vessel would appear just as any other commercial merchant ship operating in the region. 
It could make several passes through the danger zone or if necessary anchor to attract the 
attention of pirates. In addition, false communications regarding the route, crew, and 
cargo could be fed into the pirates’ global information sharing network highlighted in 
Chapter II. 
The crew of the vessel would be comprised of highly trained, heavily armed 
military or contracted personnel capable of repelling an attempt to board by the pirates. 
They would possess the element of surprise and the tactical advantage of maintaining the 
high ground compared to the pirate skiffs. If and when the pirates attacked, they would be 
met with heavy resistance and face the possibility of kill or capture.  
This type of action, when carried out a number of times, would increase the 
pirates’ uncertainty with respect to their target vessels capability and more importantly 
instill a sense of distrust regarding the true intentions of commercial vessels transiting 
through the area. Pirates could become suspicious of the intentions and capabilities of a 
potential target and may be reluctant to carry out further attacks. The anonymity gap, 
proposed by Sztompka, would be exploited in order to disrupt the capabilities of the 
pirate network. 
D. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that trust and cooperation are essential to Somali pirates’ operational 
success. Without trust or with the injection of distrust, “cooperation will fail among free 
agents” and the network would suffer severe degradation to its capacities to organize and 
operate (Sztompka, 1999, p. 62) From the analysis in Chapters II and III and successful 
influence operations in the past, it is clear that the organizational attributes of Somali 
pirate networks leave various channels open for exploitation. Anti-piracy coalitions and 
the Somali TFG should, by all means, strive to disrupt pirate organizations’ abilities to 
operate by using operations that undermine trust and promote distrust.  
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Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean continues to flourish despite the 
multi-national military effort to curtail it. The defensive strategy as adopted by the 
current anti-piracy campaign has failed to treat the root causes of the problem and only 
attempts to alleviate a single symptom. In order to successfully suppress piracy, actions 
must be taken to either bring stability and order to Somalia or disrupt the network on land 
where it originates. The former is extremely unlikely due to the turbulent and complex 
political situation that has existed in Somalia since the early 1990s. A much more viable 
solution would involve either attacking the pirates’ land sanctuaries or disrupting the 
organizational and operational capabilities of pirate networks. However, the international 
community has been hesitant to conduct kinetic actions within Somalia’s borders, 
therefore leaving disruption as a more viable solution. One means of disruption would be 
to undermine the trust required for pirate networks to operate, thus degrading their ability 
to operate. 
The historical analysis of Somalia’s chaotic past suggests the establishment of a 
stable government is unlikely in the short term. Without a central government and some 
form of regional security, pirate networks will continue to exploit the political ills of 
Somalia and threaten global trade. International shipping costs will continue to rise due to 
increased insurance premiums and longer routes to avoid potential hazard areas; the 
violence and instability brought on by piracy will continue to destabilize the region; the 
environmental dangers and potential linkage to terrorist organizations will remain a 
threat; and most importantly the lives of those aboard the hijacked vessels will continue 
to be threatened.  
The current anti-piracy efforts undertaken by the international community have 
failed to curtail piracy, suggesting a naval solution may not be the best solution to 
alleviate the problem. The pirates have altered their tactics in response to the naval 
presence and have continued to terrorize vessels on the high seas. In addition, a naval 
solution does not address piracy at its origin – inside of Somalia. Therefore, alternative 
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solutions should be considered to lessen the woes of piracy. A possible solution might be 
to utilize trust and influence operations to disrupt or degrade the organizational and 
operational capacity of the pirate networks.  
Similar operations have been successful in the past at disrupting criminal 
enterprises. The risks and uncertainty associated with these types of enterprises make 
trust an essential element in the framework of the organizations. Without trust, they 
would be unable to achieve the cooperation necessary for organizational success. By 
purposefully instilling distrust, the international anti-piracy coalition might be able to 
disrupt or degrade the pirates’ operational capacities, thereby lessening the effectiveness 
of the pirate networks and possibly making ship transits safer. 
Trust and influence operations in Somalia do, however, possess a number of 
drawbacks, which may limit their effectiveness. For one, the analysis of Somalia pointed 
out the importance of clans in Somali society. It may prove difficult to undermine the 
bonds of trust and loyalty that have been strengthened through generations of association. 
David Ronfeldt, a senior social scientist at the RAND Corporation, expressed his doubts 
in infiltrating this type of network, “You’re talking about what amounts to a clan or a 
tribe or brotherhood of blood and spilled blood. That is really tough to crack. Trying to 
infiltrate it – we’re talking years” (Garreau, 2001, p. 4). The international community 
does not possess the luxury of waiting years for a potential solution to take effect. A swift 
and immediate solution is necessary to prevent the worsening of the implications from 
piracy. In addition, intelligence regarding the structure and makeup of pirate 
organizations is limited, thus making the network analysis necessary for disruption 
extremely difficult. In order to move forward with disruption techniques intended to 
instill distrust a more comprehensive analysis of pirate networks should be undertaken.  
Despite the limitations, trust and influence techniques may prove to be a useful 
tool in the fight against Somali piracy. As previously stated, trust is an essential element 
to the organizational successes of Somali pirates. Without it, there would be no 




professor at Carnegie Mellon University suggests, “there’s no reason organizational 
glitches, screw-ups, jealousies and distrust that slow and degrade performance can’t be 
intentionally introduced” (Garreau, 2001, p. 2).  
From the continuation of pirate attacks, it is clear the current efforts have not been 
successful in solving the problem and a different approach is necessary. An offensive 
strategy utilizing the techniques to purposefully inject distrust into pirate networks as 
discussed in Chapter IV may prove useful in the fight against Somali piracy. These and 
similar techniques will mitigate some the shortcomings of the current approach by 
addressing the problem at its origin inside of Somali rather than addressing the symptoms 
of the problem at sea. 
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